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Introduction
Indigenous peoples claim greater control over and participation in decision-
making over their lives. A lack of such control and participation has been 
identified as a significant problem and impediment for achieving indigenous 
peoples’ human rights. As a result, indigenous peoples claim substantive 
rights to political participation and representation for the group, not just for 
the individuals within it. Moreover, such participation and representation is 
not merely in respect of indigenous territories, but within the mainstream 
state. As control is exercised from the top, they argue that they need to 
be participating in the decisions at the highest political levels. From the 
perspective of self-determination, this needs to be a guaranteed feature of 
the constitutional and political landscape and not one left to the whim of 
non-indigenous voters. Such participation thus needs to be enshrined in 
constitutional legislation as guaranteed political representation.
 Both democratic theory – primarily designed to protect the rights of 
individuals – and self-determination theory – designed to protect the group as 
well as the individuals in it – have come to the same conclusion. Indigenous 
peoples need a range of measures to ensure their participation in political 
decision-making. This will need to include some form of guaranteed political 
representation at the highest levels of mainstream politics and government, 
at local and national levels, and will need to be addressed as a matter of 
constitutional or electoral system design and reform.1
 The need to address this lack of control has been recognized 
internationally and has resulted in the development of international guidelines 
and standards for better political representation. Importantly, international 
law is increasingly recognizing that indigenous peoples require some form 
of guaranteed political representation and power of decision-making as a 
human rights concern. Further, for indigenous peoples to realize their human 
right to participation in decision-making, states need to take special measures 
in order to achieve it.2
 However, the more recent developments in respect of indigenous rights do 
not yet sit easily with existing, more traditional international human rights 
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laws on participation in decision-making within states, which revolve around 
electoral rights. Electoral rights in international law have been interpreted 
as providing merely procedural guarantees for individual participation in 
electing the government of a state. Further, the implementation of these 
international standards has varied in different countries and even regions 
worldwide. Significantly, group-based claims to political participation 
and representation have been rejected as discriminatory, including by the 
European Court of Human Rights. In contrast, however, the position taken 
in Latin America recognizes such substantive, group-based rights, including 
political participation and representation.
 In this paper, I first outline the traditional approach to rights of electoral 
participation within international law, offering some examples from the 
European Court of Human Rights to illustrate this position. I then discuss 
the indigenous rights approach, and show how this is the approach adopted 
in Latin America. I discuss the example of the YATAMA3 decision from the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in order to illustrate this.
 The paper concludes that the Latin American approach best integrates 
human rights concerning both electoral participation and indigenous peoples. 
It therefore provides the best example currently available for re-conceiving 
the existing principles of international law to better integrate indigenous 
rights more generally across the body of human rights law and, thus, to 
better provide for indigenous representation within domestic representative 
political bodies.
International law on electoral participation 
and representation
The traditional approach toward political representation in international law 
is based on the liberal, individualistic Western concept of democracy. If 
we look at the development of international law since the creation of the 
United Nations, initially Western governments deliberately resisted the idea 
of a right to democracy in international human rights law. Their fear was 
that the term would become meaningless due to the wide range of different 
forms of government among states. 4 Indeed, liberal democracy as we now 
understand it was then still a relatively recent adaptation.5 As a result, the 
early human rights instruments which were adopted refer to principles and 
procedural elements, but do not specify any particular type of system within 
which they must operate.
 Over the next 20 years, and particularly during the decolonization era and 
the focus on self-determination of peoples,6 the practice became to encourage 
liberal, Western-style democracy, with the holding of free and fair elections.7 
The self-determination of a people was beginning to be associated with the 
political participation of the individuals within it. While agreement on its 
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details was again not universal, there was enough agreement among states 
to adopt as the foundation for modern electoral rights, Article 25 of the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any 
of the distinctions mentioned in article 28 and without unreasonable 
restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall 
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in 
his country.9
The development of international human rights standards for modern 
electoral rights was thus based on the simple ideas of free and fair elections, 
with equal and universal suffrage. No substantive preference is made for 
any particular electoral system under these rights. Instead, democracy is 
understood solely in terms of these processes.10
 The representation of minorities in public life – and their possible 
exclusion from it as a result of different political systems – has been 
considered many times by political and human rights theorists as well as 
by practitioners and those involved in implementing such systems. It was 
explicitly considered during the drafting of what became Article 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, any direction 
in the Covenant which might have resulted in suggesting particular electoral 
systems to better represent minorities was explicitly rejected. Instead, the 
enhancement of electoral participation by minority groups was considered 
to be a matter for internal state affairs.11
 The rush to democracy as a result of the break up of Eastern Europe led 
to suggestions that there is now an international legal right to Western-style, 
liberal democracy; this right entailed:12
• that elections be held at periodic intervals
• freely available and non-discriminatory candidature for office
• party pluralism
• that neither parties nor candidates can be rejected based on ideology or 
other discriminating norms
• access to the mass media for opposition parties on a non-discriminatory 
basis
• secret ballots (even in states with high percentages of illiterate voters)
• universal suffrage
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• voters to have freedom to choose between candidates
• votes to be fairly counted.
It is notable that the content of the right as described above addresses 
only aspects of the conduct of elections for government. There is no 
standard or requirement as to the type of electoral system to be adopted, 
or the constitutional protections for minorities.13 Thus, under this right it is 
theoretically and legally possible to have a democracy where free and fair 
elections take place, but where other civil rights are not protected fully.14 
It is claimed, instead, that democracy is a ‘master right’ – at the top of 
the human rights pyramid.15 Like self-determination, it is supposedly a pre-
requisite for other human rights being protected.16
 In relation to the representation of minorities, the individualistic nature of 
representation has been stressed in discussion of the international standards, 
as well as the importance of equality and non-discrimination. Simple majority 
electoral systems are not considered per se discriminatory.17 Instead, the fact 
that a minority interest might be overridden by the majority, consistently 
and over time, is a necessary result of a democracy.
 This view of electoral rights has been enforced by United Nations Treaty 
bodies, applied by international election assistance teams, and adopted by 
states and some regional bodies.18 Where indigenous peoples have been 
underrepresented in decision-making positions within states or in political 
participation generally, this has been discussed and treated as a matter of 
discrimination.19 It has not been suggested that there is any substantive right 
to participation which is any different from that of any other citizen, or that 
remedies might lie within the design of electoral systems and methods of 
representation.
 In contrast, for example, many democratic theorists have suggested that 
the position of minorities within states needs to be taken special account 
of in the design of an electoral system. Instead of merely formal equality, 
substantive equality should be achieved. The argument is that there should 
be group or collective rights, not just individual rights of participation. For 
example, power-sharing arrangements may be explicitly built in and/or some 
measures adopted in order to better ensure that a minority is represented 
in a national parliament. Such measures may merely take the form of the 
adoption of a proportional representation system, which is more likely to 
result in a minority-based political party winning seats in parliament. Where 
a minority is territorially concentrated, then autonomy measures and single-
member national districts may be most appropriate.20 Or a system might go 
so far as to guarantee that a particular position – such as a parliamentary 
seat – is filled by a member of a particular minority.21 The precise method 
chosen will depend on the political and social situation in the country 
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concerned. But the key feature is that an aim is substantive equality between 
groups and not merely formal equality between citizens.
 In line with such arguments, increased concern for adequate minority 
political participation and representation has been shown within some 
regional organizations. There has been more of a focus on effective, informed 
participation in public life, including participation by minorities in public 
discussions. Much of it is still expressed largely in terms of individual 
‘persons belonging to minority groups,’22 but there is also developing 
concern for group representation, in order to better fulfil the idea of public 
life consisting of discussion between relevant actors.
 However, the traditional international law on electoral rights is still 
focused on individuals and procedures. It does not adopt the more substantive 
recommendations of the political theorists and even suggests that schemes 
based on collective group rights may be contrary to human rights law. Such 
interpretations of the law have accordingly been adopted in most domestic 
and regional human rights systems. It is significant that this interpretation 
has been adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, as this court 
is well-established and its decisions are regarded highly.
 Two recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights illustrate 
this more traditional approach to electoral representation. In 2008, in 
respect of Kurdish representation in Turkey, the European Court of Human 
Rights upheld a system which effectively denied Kurdish representation due 
to an extremely high threshold requirement.23 Despite it being suggested 
that the high national vote threshold was actually a design feature, 
deliberately adopted in order to effect the denial of Kurdish representation, 
formal individual equality was applied and it was held that there was no 
discrimination inherent in the electoral system as such.
 In a decision of December 2009, the court went even further and actually 
rejected the power sharing arrangement adopted in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
as being contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights.24 There, 
while the lower parliamentary assembly was open to individual candidates 
without regard to minority affiliation, the Bosnian constitution explicitly 
allocated the seats in the upper House to persons belonging to one of the 
three main minority groups: Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs.25 Further, the 
presidency was also a collective of three persons, one from each of these 
groups.26 There was also minority interest veto and a veto provision for the 
upper House. This system was deliberately designed to restore peace by 
sharing power between the previously-warring factions and prevent inter-
ethnic conflict in the future. The Court thus agreed that the system had a 
legitimate purpose and was justified at the time it was devised. However, the 
Court held that it discriminated against persons who did not affiliate with 
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one of these three minorities (such as Romas and Jews).27 Because peace 
had now been established – that is, through the proper functioning of the 
system – such discrimination was said to be no longer justified. Overall, the 
court held that it was acceptable to have some power-sharing mechanisms 
between different minority groups in a state, especially where that was 
necessary in order to keep the peace.28 However, this was not allowed to 
be maintained if it excluded some parties on the basis of ethnicity. Instead, 
a different mechanism had to be chosen.
 While the particular power-sharing measures being examined in this case 
may seem extreme, in that the power sharing completely excluded some 
groups from participation at a particular level, it was not thought unusual or 
extreme when it was devised. Indeed, based on the previous jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights as well as other European guidelines 
for state practice in this area, it could reasonably have been expected that 
it was legally allowable under the Convention.29 However, the European 
Court suggested that all measures which assign seats or other elements of 
decision-making on the basis of ethnicity discriminate against people who 
are not members of those groups.
 Some legal commentators have argued that, under these interpretations, 
guaranteed parliamentary seats for indigenous peoples would therefore 
be contrary to international human rights law.30 This is an interesting 
implication, given that this particular measure has been adopted in various 
countries worldwide in respect of indigenous peoples – such as New Zealand, 
Taiwan, Columbia, Venezuela, Burundi and Rwanda – indeed, it has also 
been used in various countries to ensure representation of other groups, 
such as women.
The indigenous rights approach
Indigenous peoples have argued that the traditional, individualistic approach 
to human rights has not adequately protected their cultures or existence 
as peoples. They have argued for recognition of a group right to self-
determination and thus greater control over and participation in decision-
making over their lives. As a means of achieving this, they have claimed 
rights to a variety of methods of participation, from better participation 
within the mainstream state processes (including guaranteed representation, 
as well as consultation and consent over decisions that concern them) 
to complete authority or self-government by the group over autonomous 
indigenous territories.
 There is a lot of support within democratic governance theory for the 
indigenous claims made. For example, there is support for autonomous 
self-government in indigenous territories, guaranteed representation within 
Indigenous Political Representation
99
mainstream government (at national, regional and local levels), and consent 
to (that is, veto over) matters particularly concerning them. The aim is power 
sharing at national, regional and local levels through indigenous political 
participation, by the individual and the group.
 There are two reasons given for the choice of these devices. The first is 
instrumental: only through such high-level political participation in decisions 
that concern them, it is argued, will indigenous rights be protected – both 
the traditional, liberal, individualistic human rights and the more contentious 
modern concepts of group rights. The second reason focuses more on the 
group than the individual: that a key aspect of indigenous self-determination 
is self-government. For most indigenous peoples, self-determination will 
be exercised through self-government within the states in which they live 
rather than through secession and formation of an independent indigenous 
state. So, discussion has turned to how to achieve self-determination through 
self-government within the modern democratic state.
 Importantly, international human rights law is recognizing these 
indigenous claims and has recently endorsed them with the adoption of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.31 The 
Declaration reflects the substantive approaches taken by democratic theorists 
towards minority group participation within government. It recognizes the 
right of indigenous peoples to effective participation in decision-making 
and that the group right, including that of self-determination, provides the 
basis for individual participation. It upholds a right of indigenous autonomy 
or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, to 
maintain and strengthen their own institutions, while still retaining the right 
to participate fully in the life of the state. Such rights are thus not merely 
procedural but substantive and results-focused.
 It has been suggested that the rights expressed in the Declaration also 
recognize that indigenous peoples have the right to negotiate for and achieve 
a new constitutional framework which would better achieve all of these 
aspects of political participation in representation. This has been called 
‘belated State building’ – that is, redesigning the state in order to redraw 
the boundaries of power between indigenous peoples and the other groups 
within it.32 In addition to this 2007 Declaration, United Nations Treaty bodies 
have applied other aspects of international human rights law to require better 
participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making fora, including an 
emphasis on the right of the group rather than just on individuals.33
 I have identified more fully elsewhere that this newer approach to 
indigenous rights is not yet integrated with the international law concerning 
electoral rights.34 There thus exists contrasting standards within international 
human rights law: that concerning electoral rights, with its individualistic 
and procedural focus, and that concerning indigenous rights to substantive, 
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group-based political participation and representation. It is these contrasting 
standards which states and other decision-makers must implement and 
apply to the situations before them. And it is with these contrasts in mind 
that I now turn to Latin America, to identify what choices have been 
made there relating to the standards to uphold with respect to indigenous 
participation.
The Latin American approach
The Latin American approach to the political participation of minority 
groups has differed from the European approach and is more in line 
with the approach to indigenous rights under international law. In Latin 
America, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights contains a 
right to participation in government (Article 23) which is almost identical 
to Article 25 of the International Covenant, as well as almost identical to 
the equivalent right in the European Convention. The Convention recognizes 
only individual rights, not group rights; and, as we have seen, in Europe 
and international law generally, this particular provision has been interpreted 
to have an individualistic and procedural focus. Yet, despite this, both the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights have, pursuant to this right, managed to uphold 
indigenous rights to participation which have their basis in the group, not 
just individuals.
 First, it is important to note that some Latin American countries have 
already undertaken belated State-building-type exercises and amended their 
constitutions in order to better provide for indigenous self-government and/
or political representation. This has included establishing autonomous self-
government regions, such as in Nicaragua, as well as reserved or guaranteed 
parliamentary seats for indigenous representatives, such as in Colombia and 
Venezuela. Importantly, the indigenous representatives in these countries 
may be chosen through traditional indigenous decision-making procedures, 
such that selection is not based solely on liberal, Western-style democratic 
processes.
 The most significant recent interpretation of these political rights is the 
2005 case of YATAMA v Nicaragua. This case considered Nicaragua’s 
electoral law in the largely indigenous autonomous regions of the Atlantic 
Coast. These autonomous regions were the result of a re-design of the 
political order within the state, recommended by the Inter-American 
Commission in 1983,35 carried out with the full participation of the 
indigenous peoples, and established in 1987.36 The result included the right of 
the indigenous inhabitants to live and administer their own affairs according 
to their traditions and to elect and be elected as authorities of the regions.37 
Unfortunately, the Nicaraguan government has twice been found to have 
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violated the rights of the indigenous peoples within these regions, once in 
relation to their electoral rights.38
 At issue in the YATAMA decision were the state electoral laws: these 
laws required all candidates to be members of political parties, required 
each party to have fielded candidates in 80% of the municipal electorates 
in the district, and required the individuals to have been elected according 
to prescribed procedures.39 YATAMA was an indigenous organization 
which chose its candidates through traditional, indigenous, community-based 
mechanisms.40 It became a political party in order to field candidates for the 
elections to the authorities governing the regions, and was said to be ‘the 
principal indigenous political organization in the country.’41 However, it did 
not field candidates in 80% of the electorates of the autonomous regions 
because some of these electorates were dominated by voters from other 
ethnic groups.42 These electorates did not have the support for an indigenous 
candidate, nor the cultural connection for community selection. However, the 
Supreme Electoral Council prevented YATAMA from presenting candidates 
for election, ostensibly for not meeting the electoral law requirements. The 
result was ‘an abstention rate of approximately 80%’ in the regional elections, 
largely due to indigenous voters failing to vote, because there were not the 
chosen indigenous candidates to vote for.
 The court in YATAMA held that that the electoral laws in question placed 
disproportionate restrictions on the rights of political participation of the 
YATAMA candidates and of the indigenous voters who would have wanted to 
vote for them. ‘The restriction that they had to participate through a political 
party imposed . . . a form of organization alien to their practices, customs 
and traditions,’ 43 which was an ‘impediment . . . to participate effectively on 
the conduct of public affairs.’ 44 The requirement to field candidates in 80% 
of the region’s electorates ‘did not take into account that the indigenous and 
ethnic population is a minority.’ 45 The court ordered that the government 
ensure indigenous access to the political system and that they be integrated 
into the governmental institutions in a direct and proportional manner.
 In terms of the international human rights to indigenous electoral 
participation, the decision is significant in two ways. First, it is based on 
the indigenous right of autonomous self-government rising from indigenous 
rights law – that is, including cultural self-determination, land rights, and 
the application of belated state-building in order to re-design the appropriate 
relationship between indigenous peoples and the state. The decision explicitly 
bases itself on these more general rights in the Nicaraguan Constitution 
and the regional Autonomy Statute, while the provisions recognizing these 
rights and the Autonomous Regions themselves were a result of such belated 
state-building. These factors were fundamental to interpreting the right of 
electoral participation in the regions.
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 Second, the decision is squarely based on the right of political 
participation as expressed in the standard manner of Article 25 of the 
International Covenant. The court interprets this right in light of the above-
mentioned indigenous rights, to require more than formal equality of such 
comparatively standard electoral requirements. It assessed the actual effect 
of these requirements on indigenous political participation, taking into 
account their minority status; and the court ordered measures designed to 
achieve substantive equality. Moreover, the will and cultural preservation 
of the indigenous communities was considered important, not just that of 
the individual voters and candidates. Thus it recognized the need to take 
account of the indigenous group as a whole, plus the suggested methods of 
taking this into account are in line with the democratic theorists’ suggestions 
for achieving better minority group participation in political life.
 It could be argued that the YATAMA decision is peculiar to the specific 
characteristics of the Nicaraguan situation, as it contains largely indigenous 
autonomous regions, or even peculiar to Latin America, with the significant 
indigenous populations there. As such, it would not necessarily represent a 
useful precedent for other regional or international bodies to adopt in their 
interpretations of democratic rights. However, I suggest that the decision 
is not peculiar to Latin America, and that it could be applied to minority 
political participation generally. For example, it could be applied where 
the minority is substantively disenfranchised, and even more so where the 
minority cultural traditions and decision-making are different from those of 
the majority society. I suggest that the decision in YATAMA rather reflects 
an increased sensitivity to indigenous rights and a greater willingness to 
accommodate them in existing human rights law. It is only since the rise 
of indigenous human rights laws and principles that such restrictions on 
indigenous political participation have been considered discriminatory, even 
in Latin America, and especially for the reasons given by the Court in 
YATAMA.
 It is instructive to compare the YATAMA decision with that of the 
European Court of Human Rights on the electoral regulations restricting 
the Kurdish political participation, discussed above.46 If a more substantive 
approach had been taken by the European Court in that case – that is, an 
approach more in line with that taken by the Inter-American Court – then 
the decision could have been very different. As in YATAMA, it could have 
recognized that the Kurdish group as a whole required better access to the 
political system. Given that the Turkish case was decided after the YATAMA 
case, it was presumably a conscious choice of the European Court to take 
the more traditional approach that it did, emphasizing formal and individual 
equality over substantive minority group equality.
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Conclusion
This paper is based on the claims made by indigenous peoples in respect 
of self-government and participation in decision-making, and on the support 
given to these claims from democratic theorists and in international law. 
The measures for protection of indigenous rights recognized in international 
law largely match those recommended by political theorists, ranging 
from consultation on measures affecting indigenous peoples to effective 
representation in government and even autonomy as a means of self-
government. International human rights law does not prescribe how best to 
achieve these ends or measures, but this will inevitably entail some form of 
belated state-building within their states, in order to re-draw the boundaries 
of power within the state.
 In contrast, however, the international law on democratic governance 
is not so accommodating of the group rights or claims emerging in the 
indigenous rights arena. Democracy has been interpreted as being a liberal 
set of procedural guarantees for individual participation in electing the 
government of a state. While group rights to cultural protection have 
been recognized, they are not well carried over into the field of electoral 
participation. Applications of the law to particular cases have denied the 
legality of some group accommodations, even where they match measures 
suggested by political and legal theorists. Further, cases of arguable 
substantive discrimination against minority groups have been upheld, often 
in the name of formal, individual equality. It has been argued that the 
various cases show that the consociational approaches favoured by theorists 
and consistent with the indigenous rights are contrary to the international 
laws on democracy.
 The Latin American experience shows that this more traditional, 
individualistic approach is not a universal interpretation of rights of 
political participation. It shows that group rights and minority guarantees 
for indigenous peoples can be upheld, even pursuant to standards worded 
almost identically to the cases where the same kinds of claims are denied. 
This thus suggests that it is not as hard a task as it may seem to integrate 
the indigenous rights standards into existing democratic political participation 
standards.
 Whatever the size of the task, efforts will need to be made at re-
conceiving the existing principles of political participation in international 
law if indigenous rights are to be integrated across the body of human rights 
law. For example, I suggest that elections need to be seen as a means to an 
end, not as the end in themselves. The appropriate end is self-determination 
of a people and thus effective participation in decision-making. As such, a 
substantive interpretation needs to be taken to such rights of participation, 
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in law not just in theory. Only with such a conception of democracy will it 
be able to achieve its claimed status as the master right through which other 
human rights will be protected. At the moment, it is certainly not sufficient 
as a master right for indigenous peoples. Indeed, it is not even sufficient for 
achieving indigenous peoples’ full or effective democratic participation, let 
alone as a means to guarantee their other human rights.
 This is not merely an academic exercise about the proper categorization 
or conception of different human rights laws. It is relevant to the creation 
and re-design of any electoral system in a country with indigenous peoples 
within it. For example, it is relevant to the debate within Aotearoa New 
Zealand over Maori representation in the new Auckland ‘supercity’ council: 
which approach one takes towards electoral rights affects whether or not 
reserved Maori seats are created on this council, and on what basis they are 
created (for example, individually-elected, Maori roll positions, or the truly 
group-based, iwi-appointed mana whenua seats). The Royal Commission on 
Auckland Governance which recommended the creation of reserved Maori 
seats in 2009 took an approach closer to that of the Inter-American Court. 
The approach taken by those who have rejected the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations reflect that of the European Court. Recognition that such 
positions and decisions are reflections of different approaches towards the 
interpretation of the relevant rights (and of what those approaches are based 
on) can affect the domestic interpretation and application of such rights.
 In conclusion, the emerging indigenous rights of participation in decision-
making are challenging the international human rights system to re-think 
some of its fundamental tenets, particularly with respect to the recognition 
of group rights. This is illustrated well with respect to the existing, more 
traditional field of political participation rights. The Latin American approach 
provides a useful example of such recognition. Explicit consideration of these 
approaches will be particularly relevant to Aotearoa New Zealand as each can 
produce a dramatically different result for the make-up of our representative 
political bodies. Importantly, for indigenous peoples, such integration can 
make a positive difference to peoples’ lives through the creation of more 
effective measures for realizing their full self-determination.
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